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Readily Than Individuals in 
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The present research compared interindividual and intergroup coalition processes. We 
examined whether groups are more likely to form small coalitions than individuals, and 
whether this tendency would depend on the social value orientation of the coalition party. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, results revealed that proselfs formed more small coalitions in 
intergroup settings than in interindividual settings whereas prosocials formed a similar number 
of small coalitions in both intergroup and interindividual settings. These and complementary 
fi ndings add credence to the claim that people who are self-oriented are more likely to exclude 
others to maximize their own payoff and that such processes are especially pronounced in 
intergroup settings.
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Confl ict may involve few or many parties. Each 
party, in turn, may represent few or many people. 
This difference in number and size of parties 
involved is also refl ected in theorizing about 
confl ict (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 
2000; De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003). First, research 
on the size of a party has emphasized that one 
should not equate fi ndings on the individual 
level to the group level. This interesting line 
of research has revealed that group decisions 
may be substantially different from individual 
decision making (Davis, 1992; Kerr, MacCoun, & 
Kramer, 1996). Second, research on the number 
of parties involved in confl ict have stressed that 
moving from a two party setting to a three or 
multiparty setting introduces a new factor in the 
negotiation process (Beersma & De Dreu, 1999; 
Crump & Glendon, 2003; Poltzer, Mannix, & 
Neale, 1998; Van Beest, Wilke, & Van Dijk, 
2003). Whereas parties in a two party setting 
either reach an agreement or not, parties in a 
three party negotiation have more freedom be-
cause they can choose with whom to negotiate. 
An important difference between a two and a 
multiparty negotiation setting therefore is that 
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the latter allows the formation of coalitions in 
which some parties are included and others are 
excluded from an agreement. As such, coalition 
formation helps researchers to understand 
when exclusion or ostracism is likely to occur 
(Williams, 2001; Zadro, Williams, & Richardson, 
2004, 2005).
Interestingly both the research on the size 
of a party and the research on the number of 
parties involved have been conducted in relative 
isolation. Research emphasizing the size of a 
party has focused on two party situations (but for 
an exception see, Insko et al., 1994). Research 
on multiparty negotiation, or more specifi cally 
coalition formation, on the other hand, has fo-
cused on individuals thereby ignoring that many 
decisions are not made by individuals but instead 
by groups of individuals (e.g. political parties). 
The aim of the current article, therefore, was to 
assess how moving from the individual level to 
the group level affects coalition behavior. We 
assessed when groups are more likely than 
individuals to exclude others from a negotiated 
agreement and reasoned that in order to answer 
this question one has to consider what members 
of a coalition party value. 
Previous coalition research
Early theorizing about coalition formation 
assumed that people are primarily motivated by 
self-interest (for a review of coalition theories 
see Komorita & Parks, 1995; Murnighan, 1978a). 
Several theories have been proposed, some 
stressing power differences, others stressing 
differences in resources, but all assuming 
that people use these differences to maximize 
their own payoff (Van Beest, Van Dijk, & Wilke, 
2004b). In line with this theorizing one of the 
most replicated fi ndings of coalition research 
is that parties would rather share payoffs with 
few others in a small coalition than with many 
others in a large coalition (e.g. Gamson, 1964; 
Komorita & Meek, 1978; Michener, Fleishman, 
Vaske, & Statza, 1975; Murnighan, 1978b; Willis, 
1962). For example, three people negotiating 
about 60 euros should be more likely to form 
two person coalitions in which both members 
obtain 30 euros than three person coalitions in 
which each member obtains 20 euros. 
Note, however, that most of these theories were 
developed in the 1960s and 1970s. Consequently 
key insights about human judgment and de-
cision making that have been developed in the 
last few decades have not been incorporated 
in our understanding of coalition behavior. 
Indeed, as Komorita and Parks already argued in 
1995, much is still to be learned about coalition 
formation. Taking up this challenge, recent coal-
ition research has taken a different approach to 
study coalition formation. In contrast to com-
paring predictive outcomes of various coalition 
theories, this new approach is more focused 
on underlying processes assuming that coalition 
formation is best understood in terms of both 
self-interest and more other-oriented concerns 
such as fairness (Van Beest, Van Dijk, & Wilke, 
2004a). 
Based on this new approach, several studies 
have now shown that coalition players are some-
times reluctant to form small coalitions and that 
they may form unnecessarily large coalitions 
instead. These studies have manipulated the 
relation between self-interest and fairness 
by considering situational and personality 
constraints. For example, although coalition 
players are likely to exclude others when they 
can obtain a distributively fair share of the 
payoff in a small coalition, they are less likely 
to exclude others when they cannot obtain a 
distributively fair payoff share in a small coalition 
(Van Beest et al., 2004a). In fact, when it is dif-
fi cult to simultaneously satisfy self-interest and 
fairness, people may form unnecessary large, 
but distributively fair, coalitions instead. Other 
studies focused on personality differences 
(Van Beest, Van Dijk, De Dreu & Wilke, 2005; 
Van Beest et al., 2003). These studies have shown 
that people who are more other-oriented are less 
likely to form small coalitions than people who 
are more self-oriented. Taken together there is 
now increasing evidence that coalition behavior 
is not only instigated by pure self-interest, or 
self-oriented max own considerations as sug-
gested by classic coalition theories, but also by 
more other-oriented considerations such as 
the extent to which forming a small coalition is 
perceived to be harmful for excluded players, 
instigating players to form unnecessary large 
coalitions instead.
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What we like to stress in the current contribu-
tion is that both the classic work and these 
more recent insights on coalition formation are 
based on coalition games in which individuals 
negotiate with other individuals. Consequently, 
a major caveat of coalition research is that it 
has ignored situations in which groups need to 
form coalitions in order to achieve a desirable 
outcome. This is surprising because many real-
life situations are not characterized by coalitions 
between individuals but, instead, by coalitions 
between groups (e.g. political parties). 
Individual and group behavior in 
other mixed-motive settings
The question of how interindividual may differ 
from intergroup behavior has been investigated 
in mixed-motive situations other than coalition 
formation. For example, numerous experi-
ments by Insko and colleagues on the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game have shown that conflicts 
between groups are more competitive than 
confl icts between individuals (for reviews see 
Schopler & Insko, 1992; Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, 
Insko, & Schopler, 2003). Three complementary 
reasons have been advanced to explain this 
interindividual–intergroup discontinuity effect. 
First, the social support explanation proposes 
that intergroup interactions are more competitive 
than interindividual interactions because group 
members can provide mutual support for the 
pursuit of self-interest, whereas such social sup-
port is not available to individuals. Second, the 
identifi ably explanation proposes that inter-
group interactions are more competitive than 
interindividual interactions because groups 
provide a shield of anonymity facilitating the 
pursuit of self-interest. Finally, the schema-based 
distrust explanation proposes that intergroup 
interactions are more competitive because the 
anticipation of interacting with another group 
activates an out-group schema, consisting of 
learned beliefs and expectations that intergroup 
interactions are aggressive and competitive. 
Apart from these explanations that are based 
on a combination of increased greed and in-
creased fear of exploitation, other researchers 
have argued that groups may just have a better 
understanding of the strategic aspects of a situ-
ation and thus more likely to understand how 
they can maximize their payoffs than individuals 
alone (Bornstein, Kugler, & Ziegelmeyer, 2004; 
Bornstein & Yaniv, 1998). For example, research 
on the Ultimatum Bargaining Game, has shown 
that groups offer less to other groups than indi-
viduals offer to other individuals (Bornstein & 
Yaniv, 1998).
Using the above fi ndings to generate predictions 
about intergroup coalition formation, the re-
asoning so far would suggest that groups should 
be more competitive, and more concerned 
with their own payoff, and thus more likely to 
exclude than individuals. However, we propose 
that this conclusion is but half the story. To draw 
a more complete picture we argue here that 
one also has to consider what members of 
coalition party value. Following the general 
assumption of interdepence theory (Kelley & 
Thibaut, 1978; Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003), 
and more specifi cally research on social value 
orientations (De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2002; 
De Kwaadsteniet, Van Dijk, Wit, & De Cremer, 
2006; Joireman, Kuhlman, Van Lange, Doi, & 
Shelley, 2003; Messick & McClintock, 1968; Van 
Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997), we 
reasoned that social interactions of coalition 
parties are not only shaped by concerns about 
their own payoff (i.e. self-interest) but also by 
broader social or interindividual concerns, 
such as concern with joint outcomes, concern 
with others’ outcomes, and concern with equality 
in outcomes. 
Given this distinction, we proposed that the 
social value orientation of a coalition party 
should moderate the magnitude of the differ-
ence between individual and group coalition 
formation. Parties that consist of individuals 
who are predisposed to enhance their own pay-
offs in either an absolute or relative manner 
(i.e. individuals with a proself orientation) may 
indeed be more likely to form small coalitions in 
an intergroup setting than in an interindividual 
coalition setting. However, parties that consist of 
individuals who are predisposed to attain equality 
in payoffs and aim to maximize joint payoffs 
(i.e. individuals with a prosocial orientation) may 
be less inclined to form more small coalitions in 
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an intergroup than in an interindividual coalition 
setting. Indeed, assuming that prosocials have a 
greater threshold for forming small coalitions 
than do proselfs (Van Beest et al., 2003), we 
argued that variables associated with intergroup 
interaction (e.g. social support, schema-based 
distrust) should have a lesser impact on the com-
petitiveness of prosocials as compared to proselfs. 
A lot has to happen for prosocials to form small 
coalitions; little has to happen for proselfs to 
forms small coalitions
Current research
To test our reasoning we used an experimental 
paradigm that has been successfully tested in 
previous experiments on individual coalition 
behavior. An important aspect of this paradigm 
is it that uses three party coalition games in 
which parties are equal on all possible levels 
of comparison. The advantage of this set-up 
is that it narrows the range of possible outcomes 
to two different types—either parties form a 
small two party coalition or a grand three party 
coalition—and thus to the basic question whether 
parties are willing to exclude others in order to 
maximize their own payoffs. Furthermore, 
because all parties are equal on all possible levels 
the distributively fair thing to do is to form a 
coalition in which coalition members obtain an 
equal payoff share. This makes it easy to compute 
how parties allocate payoffs within a coalition. 
Either they give every coalition member an equal 
share or they do not. Another advantage of the 
paradigm is that parties negotiate by means of 
a computer interface. This inhibits possible 
confounding factors that are present in face-
to-face bargaining (Bazerman et al., 2000) and 
allowed us to assess our hypothesis in terms of 
what parties wanted, what parties got, and how 
diffi cult it was to reach an agreement.
Method
Participants and design
Participants were 180 students from Leiden 
University (mean age = 20.90, SD = 2.97) as-
signed to the role of a coalition party (A, B, or 
C) in a three party coalition game. The design 
was a 2 (coalition game: interindividual vs. 
intergroup) × 2 (social value orientation: pro-
social vs. proself) design. In the intergroup 
games participants negotiated as dyads with 
two other dyads. In the interindividual games 
participants negotiated as individuals with two 
other individuals. Consequently, the analyses 
were not based on 180 observations but on 120 
observations (60 dyads and 60 individuals). 
Procedure
Participants were approached at Leiden Uni-
versity and asked to access a website. On this 
website participants filled out a computer 
version of the nine-item decomposed games 
measure of social value orientation (Messick & 
McClintock, 1968; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). 
The Decomposed Games measure has excellent 
psychometric qualities. It is internally consistent 
(e.g. Parks, 1994), reliable over substantial time 
periods (Eisenberger, Kuhlman, & Cotterell, 
1992), and is not related to measures of social 
desirability (e.g. Platow, 1994). 
Based on this measure individuals can be 
classifi ed as prosocials (i.e. people that value equal-
ity and max joint), competitors (i.e. people that 
value max diff), and individualists (i.e. people 
that value max own). Similar to other research 
and because there were no theoretical reasons 
why individualists or competitors should differ 
in their preference for forming a small coalition 
(i.e. a small coalition maximizes one’s payoff in 
an absolute and in a relative way), we combined 
the individualists and competitors into one 
group of proselfs. After participants had fi lled 
out the questionnaire they were told to leave 
their name and phone number and informed 
that an assistant would get in touch with them to 
make an appointment for the coalition study. 
Unknown to the participants, we only made 
appointments with participants who had been 
classifi ed as prosocials or as proselfs. In some 
lab sessions we only invited prosocial partici-
pants in other lab sessions we only invited proself 
participants.
We introduced our manipulation of coalition 
game when participants entered the laboratory. 
In the interindividual game, participants were 
seated alone behind a computer. In the intergroup 
59
Van Beest et al. interindividual vs. intergroup coalition behavior
game, participants were seated together behind 
a computer.1 After the participants were seated 
in their separate cubicles, we explained the 
format of the coalition game and the negotiation 
procedure. 
The format of the coalition game was based on 
the landowner paradigm (Van Beest et al.  2003, 
2004b, 2005). In the current version we told par-
ticipants that they owned one parcel of land 
with an assessed value of 20,000 euros. Next, we 
informed participants that a project developer 
was interested in buying at least two parcels for 
a fi xed prize of 60,000 euros and that unsold 
parcels would lose all their value. The project de-
veloper would not object to more land but would 
not pay more for it. To make the game more 
engaging we noted that whatever participants 
managed to get for their parcel would form the 
basis of their experimental payoff. They were 
informed that there were several prizes of 50 
euros and that obtaining a good bargaining out-
come would maximize their chance of winning 
50 euros. After this information, we repeated 
that both the two party coalitions (AB-, AC-, 
and BC-coalition) and the three party coalition 
(ABC-coalition) met the demands of the project 
developer, and that each coalition party basically 
faced the decision of whether they wanted to 
form a small coalition in which they could share 
60,000 euros with one other party or a grand 
coalition in which they had to share 60,000 
euros with two other parties.
The negotiation procedure was based on a 
procedure introduced by Kahan and Helwig 
(1971). In this procedure all parties are asked 
to formulate a coalition proposal, stating what 
coalition they wanted to form and how they 
wanted to allocate the payoff. After receiving 
the proposals, each party was asked to select the 
proposal it wanted to execute. When all parties 
included in a coalition proposal chose to execute 
the proposal, a tentative coalition was formed. 
Possible excluded parties were then given the 
opportunity to formulate a counterproposal. 
Subsequently, parties could either ratify the 
tentative coalition to make it fi nal or switch to 
the new proposal of the excluded party to form 
a new tentative coalition. When parties failed to 
reach an agreement in the fi rst place, all parties 
were asked to formulate an opening proposal 
again. This process was repeated until a fi nal 
coalition was formed. 
At the end of the experiment all participants 
were thanked and given a ticket with a number 
they had to remember until the last meeting 
of the introductory psychology course. During 
the class meeting, participants were thoroughly 
debriefed and three participants were awarded 
50 euros (1 participant from the interindividual 
coalition game and 1 dyad from the intergroup 
coalition game). 
Results
Game checks
All coalition parties recalled what was offered 
by the project developer, 99% of all coalition 
parties recalled the initial value of their parcel, 
99% of all coalition parties recalled how much 
an excluded party would obtain. All parties 
understood which coalitions they could form 
to meet the demands of the project developer. 
These percentages did not differ between 
conditions (all (χ2s < 1). This indicates that 
participants were well informed on the main 
elements of the experiment.
Preferred coalition and payoff allocation
We hypothesized that proselfs should be more 
affected by our manipulation of interindividual 
and intergroup coalition formation than pro-
socials. To test this hypothesis we fi rst analyzed 
coalition preference and allocation preference 
(see Table 1 for coalition preference and Table 2 
for payoff preference).
To analyze coalition preference, we assessed 
whether a party wanted to form a small coalition 
(i.e. AB-, AC- or BC-coalition) or a grand coalition 
(i.e. ABC-coalition). A loglinear analysis with 
social value orientation (proself vs. prosocial), 
game type (interindividual vs. intergroup), 
and coalition preference (small coalition vs. 
grand coalition) showed that participants 
preferred small coalitions (63%) to grand coal-
itions (27%) (χ2(1, N = 120) = 8.64, p < .01), 
and showed that proselfs (80%) were more 
willing to form small coalitions than prosocials 
(47%) (χ2(1, N = 120) = 15.08, p < .001). It also 
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yielded the predicted interaction between social 
value orientation and game type on coalition 
preference (χ2(1, N = 120) = 4.54, p < .05). In 
agreement with our reasoning, proselfs proposed 
more small coalitions in the intergroup game 
(93%) than in the interindividual game (67%) 
(χ2(1, n = 60) = 7.16, p < .01), whereas prosocials 
did not propose more small coalitions in the 
intergroup (47%) than in the interindividual 
game (47%) (χ2(1, n = 60) = 0, ns). 
To analyze how parties preferred to allocate 
payoffs within a coalition, we counted the num-
ber of times parties preferred to give all coalition 
members a distributively fair payoff share 
(i.e. 30:30 in a small coalition, or 20:20:20 in a 
grand coalition). A loglinear analysis with 
social value orientation, game type, and payoff 
showed that most parties preferred equal payoff 
allocations (72%) to unequal payoff allocations 
(28%) (χ2(1, N = 120) = 25.19, p < .05), and 
that proselfs (66%) were less likely to prefer 
equal payoff allocations than prosocials (78%) 
(χ2(1, N = 120) = 4.95, p < .05). There was no 
significant interaction between social value 
orientation and game type on payoff. However, 
specifi c contrasts did show that proselfs preferred 
equal allocations less in the intergroup game 
(60%) than in the interindividual game (73%) 
(χ2(1, n = 60) = 6.80, p < .01), whereas prosocials 
preferred equality in both the intergroup game 
(77%) and the interindividual game (80%) 
(χ2(1, n = 60) = 0.11, ns).
Combining the results on coalition preference 
and payoff preference, the message is clear. Not 
only do they show that proselfs are more willing 
to exclude others than prosocials, they also 
show that proselfs prefer unequal allocations 
within coalitions and that these preferences are 
augmented in the intergroup game. 
Formed coalition and actual payoff 
allocation 
The next step in our analysis of interindividual 
and intergroup coalition behavior was to inves-
tigate what coalitions were actually formed (see 
Table 3) and how the payoffs were eventually 
allocated (see Table 4).2 The difference between 
formed coalition and preferred coalition is that 
preferences are formed prior to the negotiation 
whereas the actual formed coalition is the result 
of a negotiation process and thus affected by 
the coalition choices of others. Consequently, 
formed coalition and actual payoff allocation 
are analyzed on the group level.
A loglinear analysis with social value orien-
tation, game type, and formed coalition as 
variables yielded a formed coalition effect 
(χ2 (1, N = 40) = 12.80, p < .001), and the 
predicted interaction effect of social value 
orientation and game type on formed coalition 
(χ2 (1, N = 40) = 5.51, p < .05). The formed 
coalition effect showed that small coalitions 
(78%) were formed more often than grand 
coalitions (23%). The interaction effect showed 
Table 1. Frequency of preferred coalitions by social value orientation and game type
 Prosocial Proself
  
 Interindividual Intergroup Interindividual Intergroup
Small coalitions 14 14 20 28
Grand coalitions 16 16 10 2
Table 2. Frequency of preferred payoff allocation by social value orientation and game type
 Prosocial Proself
  
 Interindividual Intergroup Interindividual Intergroup
Equal 24 23 22 18
Unequal 6 7 8 12
61
Van Beest et al. interindividual vs. intergroup coalition behavior
that proselfs formed more small coalitions 
in the intergroup game (100%) than in the 
interindividual game (70%) (χ2 (1, n = 20) = 
4.69, p < .05), whereas prosocials did not form 
more, but indeed if anything (not statistically 
signifi cant), formed fewer small coalitions in the 
intergroup game (60%) than the interindividual 
game (80%) (χ2 (1, n = 20) = .96, ns). 
Next, we analyzed how payoffs were allocated 
in formed coalitions. A loglinear analysis with 
social value orientation, game type, and payoff 
yielded an effect of payoff (χ2 (1, N = 40) = 
12.79, p < .01), an effect of game type on payoff 
(χ2 (1, N = 40) = 3.77, p < .05), and an interaction 
effect of social value orientation and game type 
on payoff (χ2 (1, N = 40) = 9.88, p < .05). The 
payoff effect showed that most coalitions de-
cided to allocate payoffs equally among their 
members (78% vs. 22%). The game type effect 
showed that distributively fair allocations were 
achieved less often in the intergroup game 
(65%) than in the interindividual game (90%). 
The interaction effect showed that proselfs 
were less likely to obtain distributively fair 
payoff allocations in the intergroup condition 
(50%) than in the interindividual condition 
(100%) (χ2 (1, n = 20) = 6.67, p < .01), whereas 
prosocials were as likely to obtain distribu-
tively fair payoff allocations in the intergroup 
game (80%) and the interindividual game (80%) 
(χ2 (1, n = 20) = 0, ns). 
These results on formed coalition mirrored 
the results on coalition preference. Proselfs 
formed more small coalitions and were less likely 
to obtain equal payoff share in the intergroup 
game than in the interindividual game. Prosocials 
were not affected by our game manipulation. 
They formed a similar number of small coalitions 
and obtained equal payoff shares in both the 
intergroup and interindividual game. 
Confl ict during negotiations
To complete our analyses of interindividual and 
intergroup behavior we took a closer look at the 
negotiation process itself. To assess the extent to 
which it was problematic to form a coalition we 
counted the number of times coalition parties 
failed to ratify a tentatively formed coalition 
(see also Van Beest et al., 2004a).
A 2 (social value orientations) × 2 (game type) 
analysis of variance on this measure of confl ict 
yielded only a main effect of social value 
orientation (F(1, 36) = 4.26, p < .05).  Independent 
of game type, proselfs (M = 2.80, SD = 2.65) failed 
more often to ratify a coalition than prosocials 
(M = 1.50, SD = 0.89). What is more interesting 
is that it mattered what kind of coalition was 
eventually formed. Specifi c t-tests that controlled 
for differences in variance showed that proselfs 
experienced more confl ict when they formed a 
grand coalition (Mgrand = 7.67, SD = 3.78 vs. Msmall = 
1.94, SD = 1.44; t(2.06) = –2.60, p =.05), whereas 
Table 3. Frequency of formed coalitions by social value orientation and game type
 Prosocial Proself
  
 Interindividual Intergroup Interindividual Intergroup
Small coalitions 8 6 7 10
Grand coalitions 2 4 3 0
Table 4. Frequency of actual payoff allocation by social value orientation and game type
 Prosocial Proself
  
 Interindividual Intergroup Interindividual Intergroup
Equal 8 8 10 5
Unequal 2 2 0 5
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prosocials experienced more confl ict when they 
formed a small coalition (Mgrand = 1.00, SD = .00 
vs. Msmall = 1.71, SD = .99; t(13) = 2.68, p < .05). 
This difference between proselfs and prosocials 
suggests that negotiations became especially 
problematic when parties did not satisfy their 
initial preference.
Discussion
The primary purpose of the current article was 
to examine how coalition behavior of groups 
differs from coalition behavior of individuals. 
Consistent with our reasoning, results showed 
that moving from an interindividual coalition 
game to an intergroup coalition game had a dif-
ferent impact on coalition behavior of proselfs 
than of prosocials. Proselfs in an intergroup 
coalition game were more likely to opt for small 
coalitions and unequal payoff allocations than 
proselfs in an interindividual coalition game. 
Prosocials in contrast, preferred to include all 
and were as likely to form small coalitions in both 
the intergroup and the interindividual game. 
This difference between prosocials and proselfs 
was also apparent in the way they negotiated. 
Proselfs formed small coalitions faster than grand 
coalitions. This suggests that proselfs did not 
fi nd it problematic to exclude others. Prosocials, 
on the other hand, formed grand coalitions 
faster than small coalitions. This suggests that 
prosocials did not fi nd it problematic to include 
all. Generally, these fi ndings make an important 
contribution to existing theory and research 
about group decision making, social value orien-
tation, and coalition formation in particular. 
In the following, we discuss each contribution, 
discuss strengths and limitations, and conclude 
by considering some broader implications.
Coalition formation
First we discuss how our fi ndings may advance 
research on coalition formation. One contribution 
is that the current fi ndings extend previous 
coalition research showing that other-oriented 
individuals prefer to include all in an agreement 
(Van Beest et al., 2003, 2005). Van Beest et al. 
(2003), for example, assessed how social value 
orientation affected coalition preferences and 
showed that prosocials prefer to include all in 
an agreement when they perceive exclusion as 
harmful. We replicated this preference effect 
and showed that preferences are translated to 
actual behavior. The second and more important 
contribution is that we extended coalition 
research by moving from the interindividual 
level to the intergroup level. We showed that 
also on this level coalition behavior should not 
only be understood in terms of self-interest but 
also in terms of more other-oriented concerns 
(Van Beest et al., 2004a). Indeed, given that 
differences in behavior between proselfs and 
prosocials were more pronounced at the inter-
group level than at the interindividual level, it 
may even be argued that the relative importance 
of these motivations were augmented at the 
group level. 
A third contribution is that we took a closer 
look at the negotiation process preceding the 
formation of a coalition. Regardless of whether 
participants negotiated in groups or as indi-
viduals, results indicated that proselfs had more 
confl ict during negotiations than prosocials, 
and especially when they ended up forming a 
grand coalition. This is interesting because from 
a coordination perspective it has been argued 
that reaching an agreement between three 
parties (i.e. forming a grand coalition) should 
be harder to coordinate than reaching an 
agreement between two parties (i.e. forming 
a small coalition) (Gamson, 1964; Komorita & 
Parks, 1995; Murnighan, 1978a). We concur, but 
add that one has to consider what parties value. 
Forming a grand coalition may indeed be a 
coordination problem for parties that aim to 
maximize their own payoffs. It seems to be less 
problematic for parties that value obtaining 
equality in payoffs. 
Group decision making and social value 
orientation
How do our results compare to previous research 
on differences between group and individual 
decision making? As we already mentioned in 
the introduction to this article, this research has 
shown that groups tend to be more competitive 
than individuals (Wildschut et al., 2003), and 
has shown that groups tend to behave more in 
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accord with game theoretic predictions (e.g. 
Bornstein et al., 2004). What we want to stress 
here is that most of these researchers have 
focused on mixed-motive situations in which two 
parties interact (but see Insko et al., 1994). We 
extended this line of research by introducing 
a third party to the negotiation table or, more 
specifi cally, the possibility that parties could 
exclude others from a negotiated agreement. 
In this setting, we reasoned and showed that 
groups may be more likely than individuals to 
exclude when they are primarily motivated to 
increase their own payoffs (i.e. proselfs) but not 
when they are motivated to obtain equality in 
payoffs (i.e. prosocials).
Our fi ndings also suggest that differences 
between prosocials and proselfs may sometimes 
become even more pronounced in intergroup 
interaction—a context that has yet to be explored 
by researchers on social value orientation. 
As a case in point, past research has shown that 
proselfs, more than prosocials, tend to evaluate 
cooperation and competition in terms of intel-
ligence and power, associating cooperation with 
weakness and stupidity and competition with 
strength and wisdom (Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken, & 
Suhre, 1986; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). In 
contrast, prosocials perceive cooperation and 
competition more strongly in terms of moral-
ity, associating cooperation with goodness and 
fairness and competition with badness and 
unfairness. Also, prosocials differ from proselfs in 
terms of their concern with collective outcomes 
as well as with their concern with equality 
in outcomes—everybody should get the same 
(Van Lange, 1999). Taken together, it is possible 
that prosocials persist in the use of these schemes, 
preferences, and perceptions in intergroup 
contexts, whereas proselfs become more strongly 
concerned with their own outcomes, and even 
less concerned with morality, fairness, and 
equality in intergroup contexts. 
The norm of self-interest
Our results also contribute to the literature on 
the norm of self interest (Miller, 1999). Miller 
argued that people ‘often act and speak in 
accordance with their perceived self-interest 
solely because they believe to do otherwise is to 
violate a powerful descriptive and prescriptive 
expectation’ (Miller, 1999, p. 1052). Interest-
ingly, he posited that this belief may be one 
of the factors underlying the interindividual–
intergroup discontinuity effect. In these terms 
our results would suggest that proselfs are more 
likely to fall prey to this norm of self-interest 
than prosocials. 
Related to this discussion is the distinction 
between how people start a negotiation and how 
they end a negotiation. Referring to the norm 
of self-interest, Tyler, Huo, and Lind (1999) 
argued and demonstrated that people enter a 
negotiation under the assumption that every 
player is solely interested in maximizing their 
own fi nancial gains, but leave the negotiation 
wishing that they had given more attention to 
relational concerns. We did not directly assess 
relational concerns, and we did not assess how 
participants felt after the negotiation ended. 
For future research, it would be interesting to 
address this issue and investigate how prosocials 
and proselfs would feel after the negotiation. 
On the one hand, one might expect that proselfs 
would be more vulnerable to experiencing a 
discontinuity between preferences at the start 
of the negotiation and post hoc evaluations of 
a negotiation because they are the ones who 
are especially likely to put own interests fi rst 
during the negotiation (see also Beersma & 
De Dreu, 2003). On the other hand, one 
could also anticipate that prosocials would be 
more susceptible to this post-decision effect 
because they are more likely to value relational 
concerns.
Strengths and limitations
A strong point of the current research is that 
we focused on behavior. We showed that our 
manipulations determined what parties wanted, 
what parties got, and how diffi cult it was to 
reach an agreement. We did not, however, 
assess what coalition parties thought during the 
negotiation because we feared that this could 
have disrupted the bargaining. A limitation 
of our approach is that we therefore cannot 
disentangle the different approaches that 
inspired our predictions. For instance, we do 
not know whether proselfs were more likely to 
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form small coalitions in an intergroup setting 
than in an interindividual setting because of (a) 
combination of greed and fear of exploitation 
(Schopler & Insko, 1992; Wildschut et al, 2003) 
or (b) because of a better understanding of the 
payoff structure (Bornstein et al., 2004). This was 
beyond the scope of the current research as 
we focused on the common thread underlying 
these approaches, but further research could for 
example assess cognitions during bargaining by 
having participants speak about what they are 
thinking during bargaining. 
Another strong point is that we assessed social 
value orientations at least two weeks prior to 
the experiment. This is important because it 
builds confi dence that social value orientation 
is indeed a relatively stable construct over time 
(Eisenberger et al., 1992; Van Lange, 1999). 
Moreover, we did not instruct participants to be 
prosocial or to be proself. All participants were 
given the same incentive scheme, namely that 
their experimental earnings were completely 
dependent on whatever they managed to obtain 
during bargaining. A possible avenue of further 
research is to use different incentive schemes to 
manipulate social value orientation (i.e. instruct 
participants to maximize own payoff, or joint 
payoff, e.g. Beersma & De Dreu, 1999, 2002, 
2003). Although it is worthwhile to recall that 
a meta-analysis on different operationalizations 
of social value in negotiation research indicated 
that assessing personality difference or telling 
people to be prosocial had similar effects 
(De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000).
Societal implications
In closing, it may be relevant to acknowledge 
some societal implications of the present 
research. Political scientist have debated for quite 
some time now that the simple rational choice 
models of government formation do not pro-
vide all the answers (Martin & Stevenson, 2001). 
One of the problems is the relatively high 
incidence of ‘oversized’ or ‘surplus-majority’ 
governments. In fact, 39% of all governing coal-
itions in Western European countries between 
1945 and 1998 included political parties that were 
not necessary to obtain a parliamentary majority 
(cf. Gallagher, Laver, & Mair, 2001). Political 
scientists may, however, have been reluctant 
to consider social psychological approaches to 
understand why surplus majority governments 
are formed (Van Beest et al., 2003, 2005) because 
social psychology experiments were based on 
individuals and not on groups. In the current 
research we showed that prosocial groups 
were more likely to include all than proself 
groups. This extends previous fi ndings on the 
individual level to the group level and shows 
that incorporating differences in social value 
orientation may be a fruitful addition to rational 
choice models to understand government 
formation. We hope that the current fi ndings 
may therefore increase confi dence in social 
psychological approaches to understand why 
oversized governments are formed. 
Notes
1. Similar to other research comparing individual 
and group behavior we used dyads to manipulate 
groups and not triplets or more. One reason why 
was that previous research on the discontinuity 
effects established that competitiveness 
increases greatly as one moves from one-on-
one interaction to two-on-two interactions, 
but slightly as one moves from two-on-two 
interaction to three-on-three interactions 
(Wildschut et al., 2003). Another reason was 
that we did not want to complicate our research 
by using a nested coalition design. Using 
triplets or more as a group manipulation has 
the disadvantage that party members may form 
within party coalitions to establish what course 
of action to take. That is, if more than two party 
members are involved one has to establish a 
majority decision rule, whereas in the current 
version all members had to agree about what 
decision they wanted to make. 
2. Data were analyzed with SPSS. This package 
controls for sampling zeros by adding 0.5 to all 
cells. The odds ratios within each table showed 
that this does not alter the pattern of the 
interactions.
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